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PETER W EDGE1 
INTRODUCTION 
The extension of marriage to same sex couples is an important policy concern in a number of 
jurisdictions across the world. This is not necessarily framed as a religious rights issue, at least in the 
constitutional discourse. In US v Windsor,2 for instance, the US Supreme Court managed to discuss 
the constitutional position of same sex marriage without any consideration of religion; the High Court 
of Australia has managed much the same in Commonwealth of Australia v The Australian Capital 
Terrority.3 In this chapter, however, rather than seeking to engage with marriage as part of the canon 
of family law (Hasday 2004), I will be putting same sex marriage very much in a religious frame, that 
is, as an issue which raises religious interests. 
Following Wintemute (Wintemute 2002), I consider love rights as going beyond recognising 
the right to share sexual activity, to enabling and recognising the development of a partnership. I 
argue that the contested areas in England have become the symbolic and ceremonial side of the 
creation of marriages – love rites rather than love rights. This emphasis on the symbolic and the 
ceremonial should not be misinterpreted as an emphasis on the trivial or the easily resolvable. Rather, 
it has generated a considerable public debate. I argue that the current debate may usefully be 
understood as a debate over coproduction of legal marriage by the state and religious organisations, 
which has become more problematic as the conceptions of marriage increasingly diverge. I argue that 
the time has come for a divorce between legal and religious production of marriage, with religious 
weddings having purely religious consequences for all religious communities. A consequent question 
is where the term marriage should then reside. One possibility is for marriage to remain a technical 
term in English law, albeit one which coexists with other usages of the same word in social and 
religious discourse. Another, more radical, way forward is for the state to cease to have any role in the 
production of marriage whatsoever, and instead to reinvent both legal marriage and legal civil 
partnerships as a single category of legal civil partnerships, with marriage ceasing to be a legal 
 
 
 
1 Thanks to participants at the Cambridge Workshop, and to Brigitte Clark of Oxford Brookes, for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
2 United States v Windsor 570 US 12 (2013) (US Supreme Court). 
3 Commonwealth of Australia v The Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55 No. C13 of 2013 (High Court 
of Australia). On the Australian context more broadly see Grossi (2012). 
construction in England. Adopting the latter, I ultimately argue for civil partnerships for all as the best 
way to address both equality and religious liberty. 
 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS IN ENGLISH LAW 
English law in relation to marriage developed from local Anglo-Saxon custom but came to be 
increasingly regulated by Christian religious law, which was relatively stable by 1300 (Helmholtz 
2004: 522-556). For a considerable period, ‘the regulation of marriage was largely a matter for the 
Church’ (Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert 2008: 1-002). After marriage law ceased to be a matter 
for ecclesiastical courts from 1836-1860,4 religious organisations and communities contributed to 
marriage particularly through the process by which marriage came to exist, which I will refer to 
throughout as wedding (Edge and Corrywright 2011). Focussing on the end of the twentieth century, 
there were two primary types of wedding – civil and religious. 
Civil weddings could occur in the office of a Superintendent Registrar.5 As the statute states 
baldly, ‘No religious service shall be used at any marriage solemnized in the office of a 
superintendent registrar’.6 This key passage has not been interpreted by the courts, with the only 
appellate decision on the section exploring a different issue.7 There is, perhaps, tangential guidance 
elsewhere in the Act. In a section dealing with weddings by the housebound and detained, provision is 
made for use of the ‘relevant form, rite or ceremony’ where the wedding is being conducted as if in a 
registered place of worship.8 This is defined in the statute as ‘a form, rite, or ceremony of a body of 
persons who meet for religious worship in any registered building being a form, rite or ceremony in 
accordance with which members of that body are married in any such registered building’.9 Even this 
section, however, has not been the subject of judicial consideration. Civil weddings could also occur 
in ‘approved premises’, where the wedding took place in a venue registered for weddings ‘according 
to such form and ceremony as the persons to be married see fit to adopt’.10 This is not as broad as it 
sounds, however, as ‘[no] religious service shall be used at a marriage on approved premises’.11 
Four routes provided for explicitly religious solemnisations of marriages. Three of them were 
specific to particular religious communities, allowing marriages to be created by the usages of the 
Society of Friends,12 Jews,13 and the Church of England.14 An important point to note here is that 
 
 
4 Marriage Act 1836, Ecclesiastical Courts Act 1855, Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, Ecclesiastical Courts 
Jurisdiction Act 1860. 
5 Marriage Act 1949 s 45(2). 
6 Marriage Act 1949 s 45(2). 
7 Miles v Wakefield [1987] AC 539, HL. 
8 Marriage Act 1949 s 45A(2), cf s 45(A)(4). 
9 Marriage Act 1949 s 45A(5). 
10 Marriage Act 1949 s 26(1)(a). 
11 Marriage Act 1949 s 46B(4). 
12 Marriage Act 1949 s 26(1)(c), s 47. 
these were not marriages within the context of these three religious groups – for instance by occurring 
in a place of worship dedicated to the religion – but by the usages of each. The canon law of the 
Church of England is part of English law, and so its usages may be determined legally.15 For the other 
two communities, explicit statutory mechanisms existed to determine the question of whether the 
marriage was according to their usages.16 The last, and most general, route emphasised not the way in 
which the wedding was carried out, but the premises on which it occurred. Marriages may occur at 
certified places of worship,17 whose governing body may authorize a person to be present at the 
solemnization of marriages without the presence of a registrar.18 Such ceremonies must include a 
brief, statutory form of words,19 and must be with the consent of the governing body,20 but otherwise 
may be ‘according to such form and ceremony as [the couple] see fit’.21 Interestingly, this does not 
necessarily require that the ceremony takes place in accordance with the particular religion practiced 
at the place of worship. 
Entering the 21st century, then, marriage was seen as a legal institution which could be created 
either purely by state activity, or, less commonly, by a partnership between the state and certain 
religious communities (Haskey 2015). The structure of the relationship was determined by the state, 
as were the rules concerning the ending of the relationship, that is, the rules for divorce. It was an 
institution that was limited to opposite sex couples only.22 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 created new ‘civil partnerships’ which had many similarities 
to marriage. The legislation has been criticised for seeking to replicate marriage (Stychin 2006; 
Bendall 2013), but also failing to do so closely enough to eliminate sexual-orientation discrimination 
in this area (Wright 2006). To portray civil partnerships as ‘gay marriage’ was often seen as over- 
simplistic (see Barker 2006; Kitzinger and Wilkinson 2004), although a concept with tremendous 
cultural traction (see also Farrimond 2015; Peel 2015). That it is a close analogy was less contested. 
Like marriage, civil partnership creates far-reaching legal incidents (Wright 2006), acts as a 
relationship ritual (Harding and Peel 2004), is legally incompatible with a subsisting marriage,23 and 
is not open to individuals within prohibited degrees of relationship.24 In a recent Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Marriage Act 1949 s 26(1)(d). 
14 Marriage Act 1949 Part II. 
15 Marriage Act 1949 Part II. 
16 Marriage Act 1949 s 55(1). 
17 Marriage Act 1949 s 41. See further R (Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages [2013] UKSC 77. 
18 Marriage Act 1949 s 43. 
19 Marriage Act 1949 s 44(3), (3a). 
20 Marriage Act 1949 s 44(1). 
21 Marriage Act 1949 s 44(1). 
22 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P and D 130; Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s 11(c). 
23 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 3(1)(b). 
24 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 3(1)(d). 
decision, Lady Hale found that ‘Civil partnership is not called marriage but in almost every other 
respect it is indistinguishable from the status of marriage in United Kingdom law’.25 
Unlike marriage weddings, however, civil partnership weddings were initially constructed as 
purely civil. The standard procedure for creation of a civil partnership required the signing of a civil 
partnership document in the presence, inter alia, of a civil partnership registrar.26 As with the routes to 
civil marriage outlined above, ‘[n]o religious service is to be used while the civil partnership registrar 
is officiating at the signing of a civil partnership document’.27 The wedding could, with an important 
exception discussed below, happen in a place approved by the registration authority, which could also 
provide a place in its area for the registration of civil partnerships.28 
It is significant to note that there was no religious route for the creation of a civil partnership, 
a position which survived the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in relation to the 
provision of goods and services.29 The provisions allowing marriage by the usages of the Church of 
England, Society of Friends, and Jews, were not extended to civil partnerships. Strikingly, the more 
general provisions concerning the certified place of worship were expressly excluded from the 
legislation. Registration of a civil partnership is formally separate from any ceremony,30 but the 
separation between civil partnership registration and religious ceremony was reinforced by a separate 
rule that registration may not take place in religious premises.31 
Civil partnerships, then, were constructed as a form of especially secularised civil ceremony. 
Specifically religious ceremonies were excluded from the process, as with civil marriage, but without 
the possibility of religious routes. This exclusion of religion was deliberate: 
 
[O]pposite-sex couples can opt for a religious or civil marriage ceremony as they choose, 
whereas civil partnership is an exclusively civil procedure. The government has been very 
clear throughout the process that it has no plans to bring in same sex marriage. Marriage is an 
institution for opposite couples with its own historical traditions. Civil partnership provides a 
separate and distinct relationship, which is secular in nature and only open to same sex 
couples. (Falconer of Thoroton 2007: 5-6) 
 
The exclusion of religion from the creation of civil partnerships began to be queried by couples who 
wished to form a civil partnership through a religious ceremony, and by religious communities who 
 
 
 
25 Bull and Another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73, [26]. This is not a view shared by the applicants in 
Wilkinson, discussed below. 
26 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 2(1)-(4). 
27 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 2(6). 
28 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 6(5). 
29 See Department for Communities and Local Government 2007. 
30 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 2(1). 
31 Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 6(1)(b). 
wished to create such partnerships as a religious act.32 As a result, a 2011 change in the law allowed 
religious premises to be used for those communities which wished to do so, but the ceremony 
remained a civil one, which could not ‘be religious in nature’. The first religious community to take 
advantage of this was the Cross Street Unitarian Chapel in Manchester, but the first civil partnership 
ceremony in a place of worship appears to have been carried out by the Quakers at Friends House in 
London. Some religious communities may be willing to extend their services to civil partnerships, but 
may have been deterred by the additional process and fee,33 but obviously many communities who did 
not accept same sex unions within their religious thinking deliberately choose not to register. 
 
 
 
SAME SEX MARRIAGE IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
 
It will be recalled that the fundamental distinctions between civil partnerships and marriage were the 
gender polarity of the couple, and the exclusion of religious possibilities from civil partnerships. Both 
may have been less stable than anticipated. Opposite sex couples sought access to civil partnerships, 34 
and same sex couples sought access to marriage.35 The 2011 amendment to the law had itself begun to 
recognise that the complete exclusion of religion from civil partnerships should not be maintained. 
In 2012 the Home Office consulted on extending marriage to same sex couples. It received 
over 228,000 responses. The concept was rejected by bodies such as the Coalition for Marriage, the 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Church of England, the Muslim Council of Britain, and the 
Evangelical Alliance as misunderstanding the nature of marriage, which was exclusively heterosexual. 
The Government proposed to enable same sex couples to have a civil marriage, and to permit 
religious organisations that wished to conduct same sex marriages to do so, but with explicit 
protection for religious organisations and clergy that did not wish to do so;36 and to retain civil 
partnerships for same sex couples only, but allow existing civil partnerships to be converted to 
marriage. In response, more than one thousand Roman Catholic clerics signed an open letter arguing 
 
 
 
32 Notably by the Quakers in 2009, whose Yearly Meeting, resolved ‘to enable same sex marriages in a meeting 
for worship under the care of a meeting as we currently do for opposite sex marriages’ (see Yearly Meeting, 
‘Epistle from Britain Yearly Meeting Gathering 25 July to 1 August 2009’, http://www.ymg.org.uk/ (accessed 6 
October 2009).; see also FLGBTQC (Friends for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Concerns), 
‘Collection of Marriage Minutes’, http://flgbtqc.quaker.org/marriageminutes.html (accessed 29 October 2008)). 
33 As discussed in General Register Office, Civil partnerships on religious premises: Some Frequently Asked 
Questions, GRO, November 2013. 
34 For instance Stephanie Munro and Andrew O’Neill, who have petitioned the European Court of Human 
Rights as part of the Equal Love case – see further equallove.org.uk/the-legal-case (accessed 26 February 2014). 
35 For instance Sharon Ferguson and Franka Strietzel, who also form part of the Equal Love case, referred to 
above. 
36 This responded to a long-standing concern, significant in the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998, that 
allowing same sex partnerships would lead to religious organisations being compelled to religiously sanctify 
them – see Cumper 2000. 
that same sex marriage would return them to persecution, rendering them unable to teach ‘the truth 
about marriage in their schools, charitable institutions or places of worship’.37 
The Government proceeded with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill 2012-2013. The Bill 
included specific protection for religious organisations and individuals who did not wish to solemnise 
same sex marriage. The Church of England, by virtue of its constitutional position, was not entitled 
under the Bill to decide for itself on same sex marriage, but instead was prohibited from carrying out 
such marriages without further legislation. Controllers of places of worship, as well as Quakers and 
Jews, could ‘opt in’ to religious marriage of same sex couples, but no organisation could be 
compelled to opt in, and no one could be compelled to carry out a same sex marriage. The Bill passed 
its key second reading in the House of Commons in February 2013, with a very significant majority of 
MPs voting for the Bill. 
The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 extends marriage to same sex couples,38 and 
provides routes for conversion of existing civil partnerships to marriages.39 The Church of England 
does not thereby become required to, or entitled to marry same sex couples,40 nor do any clergy 
otherwise required to solemnise marriages become required to solemnise the marriage of a same sex 
couple.41 Other religious organisations are protected by the detailed provisions of section 2. This 
protects organisations from any compulsion, including enforcement of a legal requirement, 
concerning an opt-in activity.42 Further, a similar protection from compulsion exists where a person 
refuses to conduct, participate in, or consent to a marriage because a same sex couple is getting 
married.43 The same section amends the Equality Act 2010, the principal equality legislation in UK 
law, to exclude the provision of religious marriage of same sex couples.44 The principal purpose of 
Section 2 is to protect religious organisations from being compelled to exercise the opt-in powers later 
in the Act. Sections 4 and 5 amend the Marriage Act 1949 to allow a same sex couple to be married in 
a registered place of worship ‘according to such form and ceremony as the persons to be married see 
fit to adopt’, but only where the governing authority has given written consent to marriages of same 
sex couples.45 The governing authority is an internal one – ‘the persons or persons recognised by the 
members of the relevant religious organisation as competent for the purpose of giving consent for the 
purposes of this section’.46 Similar provisions continue the practice of treating religious marriages by 
the Society and Friends and by Jews specifically, but mirror the requirement of a positive decision in 
 
 
37 See Scottish Catholic Observer, ‘A vow to protect freedom’ (2013) January 18. 
38 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 s 1. 
39 Ibid, s 9. 
40 The Church in Wales, with a different constitutional position, has an opt-in power under Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013 s 8. 
41 Ibid, s 1(3)-(5). 
42 Ibid, s 2(1). 
43 Ibid, s 2(2). 
44 Ibid, s 2(5), 2(6). 
45 Marriage Act 1949 s 26A, as amended. 
46 Marriage Act 1949 s 26(A)(4) as amended. 
writing by the ‘relevant governing authority’.47  Belief organisations, that is organisations ‘whose 
principle or sole purpose is the advancement of a system of non-religious beliefs which relate to 
morality or ethics’ remain unable to carry out religious weddings of any type, because of their 
inability to register a place of worship.48 The statute requires that their position must be reviewed by 
the Secretary of State before January 2015.49 
 
 
 
RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL MARRIAGE: TIME FOR A DIVORCE50 
 
The flashpoint for the recent debate in the UK was not open disagreement between the substantive 
incidents which should follow from a legal partnership between a same sex couple as opposed to an 
opposite sex couple, or disagreement about the morality of same sex relationships (Jowett 2014). 
Although no doubt some of the opposition to same sex marriage was from those who considered the 
Civil Partnership Act a poor piece of legislation, this was not the battleground upon which the debate 
took place. Nor were specific concerns about the position of religious communities which did not 
wish to carry out same sex religious marriages central to the debate. Religious communities were 
discussed primarily in relation to protecting the autonomy of religious communities to ‘opt in’, or not, 
as they choose. The Catholic Church, for instance, is no more compelled to create a same sex pathway 
to religious marriage than it has been compelled to create an opposite sex pathway for divorcees. 
Instead, the recent debate has focussed on symbol, ceremony, and language. As discussed below, the 
decision of the state to define ‘marriage’ in a new way was resisted in Parliament. Strikingly, we can 
see parallels in similar debates outside the UK. In the case before the High Court of Australia for 
instance, the Commonwealth of Australia phrased its opposition to the ACT legislation singularly 
narrowly: 
 
Of course, the ACT Marriage Act could have validly extended rights under ACT law to same 
sex couples as if they were in a marriage - thereby accepting and acting upon the demarcation 
of status effected by the Commonwealth Acts. But what it purports to do instead is to 
authorise and clothe in legality as a marriage or equal form of marriage that which under 
Australian law cannot be such.51 
 
 
 
 
47 Marriage Act 1949 s 26B, as amended. 
48 This restriction has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court – see R (Hodkin and another) v Registrar 
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77, per Lord Toulson at [57]-[59]. 
49 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 s.14. 
50 See also Presser 2012. 
51 Federal argument, para 37 (submitted 13 November 2013). 
It should not be thought that this reduces the importance of the debate. Symbol, ceremony, and 
language matter (see further Barker 2011; Bamforth 2007; Auchmuty 2008). Indeed, this moving of 
the debate to a relatively high level of abstraction and principle may reduce the scope for pragmatic 
compromise between different groups. The emphasis on principle increases the difficulty of 
developing a ‘family law [which] would decide this important question without unduly denigrating or 
devaluing any particular social front’ (Huntington 2013: 646). The 2013 Act, for instance, was 
welcomed by Ben Summerskill of Stonewall as ‘the last piece of the legislative jigsaw providing 
equality  for  gay  people’, 52  but  criticised  by  Sir  Roger  Gale  MP  as  ‘Orwellian  almost,  for  any 
government … to seek to come along and rewrite the political lexicon’.53 Let me state an abstract 
version of the two positions – it should be stressed that I am not seeking to précis either Ben 
Summerskill or Sir Roger Gale. 
From the perspective of a supporter of same sex marriage, a distinction between civil 
partnership and marriage was a violation of equality norms because it treated similarly placed persons 
differently. Love rights are love rights regardless of the gender of the loving, and former distinctions 
between opposite sex and same sex unions needed to be recognised as arbitrary discrimination and 
removed. Even if civil partnership and marriage were identical in every way except nomenclature and 
sexual polarity, this would still constitute discrimination. By excluding same sex couples from 
marriage the law carried the message that the relationship was less authentic - in the words of pivotal 
former law, a ‘pretended family relationship’.54 It sought to police a separation between the modern 
era and the past, severing same sex couples from their family traditions of marriage, which would 
typically emerge from an opposite sex couple. 55 While it was acceptable to allow religious 
organisations and people some space to set their values against equality norms here, by not requiring 
them to provide religious marriage services to same sex couples, religious organisations could not 
exercise a monopoly over the definition of marriage. As one commentator has put it, ‘[t]he law 
cannot, and probably should not attempt to, change the doctrinal understandings of such religious 
bodies - but nor may it reflect such understandings in its own rules’ (Norrie 2011: 98-9). 
From the perspective of an opponent of same sex marriage, a distinction between civil 
partnership and marriage respected equality norms because it treated differently placed persons 
differently. While it was important to ensure that people of all sexual orientations were treated 
decently, for instance by according the incidents of civil partnerships to those who enter into them, 
same sex and opposite sex relationships were not the same.56 In particular, marriage was intrinsically 
 
 
52 Stonewall, ‘Same Sex Marriage Bill Storms through House of Commons’, (Press Release, 5 February 2013) at  
http://www.stonewall.org.uk/media/current_releases/8461.asp (accessed 26 February 2014). 
53 Roger Gale MP, Hansard HC vol ** col 152 (5 February 2013). 
54 Local Government Act 1988 s 28; repealed by Local Government Act 2003 s 122. 
55 This is an area the importance of which I consistently underplay in my writing. I am grateful to Michael 
Holdsworth, formerly of Oxford Brookes University, for his insights on this point. 
56 This is the view of government policy taken in Kitzinger and Wilkinson [2006] HRLR 36. 
limited to opposite sex couples. The distinction may arise from the relative ease of reproduction for 
the stereotypical opposite sex couple; essentialist constructions of the different sexes in partnership; 
tradition and culture; or religion, particularly a long theological tradition which sees the family as 
prior to the state. Whatever its source, this distinction was a given that the state needed to recognise – 
it could not simply change the definition of marriage. 
The key to draw from these abstractions is that both poles neglect the history of marriage in 
English law, as a history of coproduction of marriage between the state and religious organisations 
and communities.57 In England, marriage is both a religious and a national legal concept in a sense 
that say nissuin58 and nikah59 are not. The controversy over the definition of ‘marriage’, particularly 
by those seeking change, has not given sufficient weight to this co-production. Both the state, and 
religious organisations who use the term, have a stake in ‘marriage’ which is not easily replicated 
elsewhere across the law/religion scene. 
This co-production should not be caricatured as a unified front between the state and 
significant religions. As the Church in Wales has recently noted: 
 
It is true that church and state have already disagreed profoundly. The first dispute was in 
1835 (until 1907) on the Table of Kindred and Affinity (can a man marry his deceased wife's 
sister?), and again in 1937 on the liberalization of divorce by the state. Archbishop Lang felt 
that this was a watershed. It was only in 2002 that the Church of England allowed divorced 
people to marry in church under certain circumstances, and so came into line with civil law 
(the Church in Wales always had some discretion from the 1990s). Now the introduction of 
same sex marriage causes further tensions. That leaves a major challenge for how the church 
will relate to the state on their doctrine of marriage.60 
 
Neither is the new understanding of marriage contained in the legislation incompatible with all 
religious stances. As noted in relation to the development of religious routes to civil partnership, some 
religious organisations and individuals take exactly the positive view of same sex marriage I have 
sketched above. It is fair to say, however, that the understandings of the state and demographically 
significant religious communities about marriage have now diverged to an unusual degree – and the 
extent of this divergence is what has given the debate about symbol, ceremony, and language such 
heat. 
 
 
 
 
57 For a broader reflection on similar ideas, see Nichols 2012. 
58 The Jewish religious term normally translated as marriage. 
59 The Muslim religious term normally translated as marriage. 
60 Standing Doctrinal Commission of the Church in Wales, ‘The Church in Wales and Same sex Partnerships’ 
(March 2014), para. 29. 
One way of understanding the 2004 Act is as an attempt to address the discrimination faced 
by same sex couples without requiring the cooperation of religious groups in the co-production of 
marriage. In the passage quoted earlier, Lord Falconer said that civil partnership differed  from 
marriage in being for same sex couples, and exclusively civil. Let me recast the last ground in terms 
of co-production – civil partnerships were not co-produced with religious communities and 
organisations. Not only did they not depend upon religious communities for their implementation, but 
in the first iterations of the law, religious communities were positively, and strongly, excluded from 
the production of civil partnerships. The justifiable scepticism about ‘separate but equal’ or even 
‘separate but same’ strategies when dealing with a historically persecuted minority (see further Barker 
2011; Baker and Elizabeth 2012), as well as the call for change by religious communities who found 
their powers over religiously wedding couples divided by the state in a way they found arbitrary, 
rendered this resolution to the problem of coproduction of marriage unstable. At the time of writing 
the state has chosen to redefine marriage in line with state values of non-discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, rather than in line with the values of the demographically significant 
religious communities who opposed this definition in the consultation process. 
There was a pressing need to reform the law to recognise that ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgendered individuals are generally entitled to equal treatment with heterosexual individuals’ 
(Wintemute and Andenaes 2001: 4). From my perspective, the new legal position is much better than 
the previous distinction between civil partnership and marriage. But there is another way of resolving 
the problem which gives better weight to both equality and religious freedom; that is the removal of 
religious marriage from the legal sphere entirely, and the universalising of a creature purely of state 
law, which for the moment I will refer to as civil partnership.61 Coproduction would be ended by 
recognising that civil partnerships are an exclusively legal concept which the state is exclusively 
entitled to shape according to its own values, which will of course involve how it constructs religious 
liberty; and that religious marriage (as nissuin, zawadj and other religious partnerships) is an 
exclusively religious concept which different religious communities are exclusively entitled to shape 
according to their own values.62 This would lead, as the religious think tank Ecclesia has put it, to ‘a 
mutually beneficial disentangling of the roles, interests, and practices of church and state’ (Barrow 
2006). 
As to the argument from equality, the current regime means that some religious weddings 
create legal incidents, and some do not – as Chatterjee observed of the post-1837 marriage landscape, 
‘“choice” has indeed been extended in the realm of marriage laws, but different kinds of religious 
choices still  result in different  status  in  law’  (Chatterjee  2010:  535).  With  the  recent,  overdue, 
 
 
 
61 My conclusion, although not my argument, can also be found in Norrie 2011. 
62 For a detailed argument against this separation of law and religion in the specific context of the family, see 
further Shachar 2010. 
liberalisation of the law concerning registration of places of worship in Hodkin, religious communities 
sufficiently well-resourced to be able to operate a place of worship are largely able, if they choose, to 
access a route to marry. Religious communities which are not so placed cannot. Additionally, there is 
some evidence that the distinction between purely religious marriage, and legal marriage, is not 
recognised with equal clarity across different communities (see Douglas 2011). The removal of legal 
effect from all religious weddings, regardless of the access of a community to a registered place of 
worship which carries out legal marriages, would simplify and equalise the legal consequences of 
religious wedding. 
In relation to the argument from religious freedom, the state has a strong interest in 
determining the content of its partnership law, and inevitably this will be in accord with its 
fundamental values. Within a religiously plural state, the issue then arises of how it is to deal with 
communities whose values conflict. Within a coproduction model, there is a distinction between 
religious communities whose values are sufficiently aligned to allow coproduction, and those who are 
not. The potential for entanglement between religion and state is high. Removing legal effect from 
religious weddings removes this potential, and allows religious communities to shape  marriage 
without the influence of legal recognition for particular shapings. It may be argued, however, that 
removing legal effect actually reduces religious liberty in two ways – the liberty of religious 
organisations who want their religious ceremonies to have legal effect in state law, and the liberty of a 
marrying couple who want their religious ceremony to have this effect. I have already suggested that a 
state demand to confer a religious ceremony is unlikely to succeed on religious liberty grounds; the 
same approach suggests that a religious demand for conferment of particular state benefits through a 
religious ceremony is also unlikely to succeed. 
One issue arising from this ‘civil partnerships for all’ approach is how to articulate religious 
wedding, which will create in the religious law or understandings of the community a marriage, 
nissuin, zawadj and the like; with the civil partnership ceremony which will create a legal civil 
partnership. This concern with articulation is not particularly novel. In Australia, the 
Commonwealth’s current Marriage Act includes provision for allowing a legal marriage to be 
followed by a second ‘religious ceremony of marriage’, which is predicated upon the proving of the 
legal marriage. 63 There are a number of possible forms of articulation, the simplest being none 
whatsoever – couples are free to carry out whatever religious ceremonies they wish, which are 
completely immaterial to the legal creation of a civil partnership. Another is to allow some degree of 
articulation, as we saw in the 2011 reforms to civil partnerships and religious places of worship. This 
opens up the possibility of distinguishing between different religions by different degrees of 
articulation. 
 
 
 
63 Marriage Act 1961 s 113(5) (Commonwealth of Australia). 
One concern by those who did not see same sex partnerships as religiously identical to 
opposite sex partnerships was that allowing religious routes to such partnerships would pressure them 
to change their stance. At its most blunt, there are arguments that once marriage is defined in a way 
which does not depend upon sexual polarity, equality law can be used to compel religious 
sanctification of same sex marriage. Although an abiding concern for religious communities which 
would fear such an outcome, this already weak argument has been dealt with explicitly in the new 
legislation. More subtly, and more accurately, it may also be that once religious communities can 
carry out same sex marriages, a debate will take place within the communities as to whether they 
should carry out such marriages. So by opening up the possibility of same sex religious weddings, the 
state nudges communities which do not currently endorse these views on a journey towards 
compliance with state values. Articulation could be used to take this nudge further, to allow religious 
communities whose vision of marriage is compatible with that of the state to articulate more smoothly 
into the creation of legal civil partnerships. Allowing this to operate at the level of the individual 
couple may be too complex, and in any case would not be a particularly effective nudge. The 
organisation would need to be assessed for its congruence with the legal definition of civil partnership 
generally to secure this preferential status. 
I have argued elsewhere that using state power deliberately to encourage theological change 
within a community in order to bring it into line with state values and aims should always be a cause 
for concern (Edge 2010; cf for instance Jackson 2009). As may be expected, therefore, I do not 
advocate the adoption of this mechanism to distinguish between state-compliant religions and others, 
and seek to reward transition into state-compliance with legal incentives. If, however, this approach is 
not seen as objectionable it should at least be applied consistently – which of course is not the case in 
the current regime, with its explicit protections for religious autonomy in relation to sexual polarity, 
but not other conflicts between religious and state values. So not only would this articulation need to 
be withheld from communities who distinguish on sexual polarity when the state does not, but also 
from communities which refuse to marry people of different religions or races, people with particular 
disabilities except where the state also refuses marital status, and of course divorcees. Religious 
communities with different views of marriage in terms of ending of the commitment, or the 
compatibility of the commitment with multiple partners, would also be excluded. A strikingly small 
number of communities may, ultimately, qualify for this preferential treatment. 
 
 
 
BUT WHO GETS THE HOUSE? ABANDONING MARRIAGE AS A LEGAL TERM 
 
 
The Act includes provision for turning civil partnerships into marriages, which will come into force in 
December 2014. In this final section I argue for the opposite. It is perhaps worth my being frank that 
the remaining differences between civil partnerships and opposite sex marriage seem to me to favour 
civil partnerships as a structure. Marriage, but not civil partnership, keeps an emphasis on 
consummation. A similar emphasis can be found in adultery, one of the routes to leave it (although 
technically this opposite sex activity will also justify divorce in a same sex marriage). Along with 
Herring, I find this emphasis on a very particular kind of sexual activity unnecessary (Herring 2015). 
My preference for civil partnership over marriage seems, it is also worth noting, a minority view for 
heterosexuals in Britain.64 
If there is to be a distinction between religious marriage, etc, and intimate partnerships 
recognised by law, one possibility is to leave the terms as they are. There will be legal ideas of what a 
marriage is, religious ideas, and social ideas, and they may bear very little relationship to one another. 
This leaves open the possibility of confusion. It also suggests a degree of continuity with former ideas 
of intimate partnerships which may hamper the development of this area of law. It would also mean 
that the legal system was using a term shared with a particular subset of religions in the jurisdiction, 
but not others. It may be better for a purely legal institution to have a distinct linguistic identity, and to 
leave ‘marriage’ to the religious communities with which it has been shared. 
It may be argued that by moving the state out of marriage, I am giving insufficient weight to 
the social goods that marriage provides. If I were to argue not only for the abolition of legal marriage, 
but also civil partnerships, this would be a strong criticism. By retaining state involvement in civil 
partnerships, however, the state role in supporting ‘the social bases of caring relationships’ (Brake 
2010: 173) is maintained. Additionally, crafting civil partnerships as a purely legal institution opens 
up the possibility for more radical changes in this institution – for instance to move away from 
Brake’s amatonormativity to support other forms of caring relationship (see further Herring 2015); or 
to move towards Ristroph and Murray’s ‘disestablished family’ (Ristroph and Murray 2010). The 
remaining force of this criticism, however, concerns the cultural significance of marriage, and the 
‘intangible benefit’ of ‘access to a deeply meaningful institution – it is about equal participation in the 
activity, expression, security and integrity of marriage’.65 While the abolition of legal marriage for 
opposite sex couples would address the issue of equal participation, it would not meet the needs of 
couples – both same sex and opposite sex – who see legal marriage as more significant, or more 
binding, than a civil partnership (see Merin 2002: 274-277). 
It may also be argued that the term ‘marriage’ should remain a state possession, and that the 
state giving up this property is not a neutral way of resolving the (religious) disputes as to definition 
of marriage which have characterised the current debate. There is some strength in this. Advocating a 
removal of a legal position is not the same as advocating that such a legal position should not be 
 
 
 
 
64  See  the  2013  yougov  poll  at  http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/05/19/public-supports-civil-partnerships-all/ 
(accessed 26 February 2014). 
65 Halpern v Canada (AG) (2002) CanLII 427949. 
adopted. Marriage at the moment clearly is a legal institution, and changing that will not satisfy those 
who wish to use state power to resolve the definitional arguments. 
More concretely, it may also be argued that there is a legal right to marriage,66 as opposed to 
civil partnership. In practice, arguments which engage with this frequently move between a right to 
marriage per se, and the discrimination inherent in some couples being able to marry and others not, 
with the emphasis on the latter. A good example is the witness statement of Susan Wilkinson, who 
sought to have her Canadian marriage to another woman recognised as a marriage, rather than a civil 
partnership.67 She argued that she did not wish her relationship to be recognised as a civil partnership: 
 
it is simply not acceptable to be asked to pretend that this marriage is a civil partnership. 
While marriage remains open to heterosexual couples only, offering the ‘consolation prize’ of 
a civil partnership to lesbians and gay men is offensive and demeaning. Marriage is our 
society’s fundamental social institution for recognising the couple relationship and access to 
this institution is an equal rights issue … to have our relationship denied that symbolic status 
devalues it relative to the relationships of heterosexual couples.68 
 
Discrimination aside, is there a right to marry? The European Convention on Human Rights provides, 
under Article 12, that ‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right’. Is this a fatal obstacle? 
The ECHR has been reluctant to intervene too closely in national marriage law, as we see in B&L v 
UK for instance, where the Court states that : 
 
Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law and given the 
sensitive moral choices concerned and the importance attached to the protection of children 
and the fostering of secure family environments, this court must not rush to substitute its own 
judgment in place of the authorities that are best place to assess and respond to the needs of 
society.69 
 
Nonetheless, Article 12 has some effect, and would prevent a state imposing some bans on marriage. 
In Goodwin,70 for instance, the court found ‘no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying 
the right to marry under any circumstances’.71 It is probably not open, therefore, for the state to 
 
 
 
66 Article 12 of the ECHR. 
67 See Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam). 
68 Ibid, at [5]. 
69 B & L v UK [2005] (App. 36536/02), at [36]. 
70 Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (ECtHRts). 
71 Goodwin, at [103]. 
remove the legal framework allowing for recognition of a legal couple.72 The specific question here is 
whether it requires that the legal relationship between a couple who are covered by Article 12 be 
called ‘marriage’. 
The official languages of the ECHR are English and French, although other languages are 
used by the Court. As may be anticipated, the word ‘marry’ is not used in both the, equally definitive, 
versions of the Convention. The English language version of Article 12 uses ‘marry’, the French 
‘marier’ – English and French for the same concept in the respective languages , but obviously not the 
same word. Beyond the official text itself, there is much diversity in Member States practice. In 
Germany, for instance, the Basic Law of 1949, under article 6(1) states ‘Ehe und Familie stehen unter 
dem besonderen Schutze der staatlichen Ordnung’, normally translated as ‘Marriage and the family 
shall enjoy the special protection of the state’ (Sanders 2012). So a right to have a relationship entitled 
‘marriage’ would not seem to be contained in the ECHR. 
This may fairly be rejected as an excessively lawyerly form of pedantry. Might Article 12 
guarantee the right to form a ‘marriage’ recognised as such in the official language of the State party 
in question? Even this is not to me a rejection of abolitionism. If marriage ceases to be a legal term in 
England, and is replaced throughout with the term ‘civil partnership’, it may then be argued that that 
term becomes the term which parties have a right to have their relationship recognised as. 
The case law is, similarly, not supportive of an insistence on a right to a particular term. In 
Schalk and Kopf v Austria,73 it is true, the Court rejected an argument by Austria that the case be 
struck out because of the availability of registered partnerships for a same sex couple who sought the 
right to marry. The differential treatment inherent in the existence of opposite sex marriage was, 
however, clearly relevant to this decision: ‘the said Act allows same sex couples to obtain only a 
status similar or comparable to marriage, but does not grant them access to marriage, which remains 
reserved for different-sex couples’.74 
The abolition of marriage would not, of course, be without its practical problems. Most 
significant of these is the issue of recognition of legal relationships internationally (see further Curry- 
Sumner 2005; Frimston 2006; Curry-Sumner 2007; Curry-Sumner 2008). These were not seen as 
insurmountable when civil partnerships were the only forms of love rights available to same sex 
couples, however, and it is not clear to me that they are more insurmountable when they are the only 
form of love rights available to anyone. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
72 See also Van Oosterwijck v Belgium (1981) 3 EHRR 557, Com Rep. 
73 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20, ECtHRts. 
74 Ibid, at [37]. 
As a final word, during the passage of the Civil Partnership Act through Parliament, the responsible 
minister, Jacquie Smith, was pressed on whether the government supported same sex marriage. She 
replied: 
 
I recognise that many hon. Members on both sides of the House understand and feel very 
strongly about specific religious connotations of marriage. The Government are taking a 
secular approach to resolve the specific problems of same sex couples. As others have said, 
that is the appropriate and modern way for the 21st century.75 
 
If I can remove ‘same sex’ from her words, and look to treat both same sex and opposite sex couples 
the same in law, then we are in agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Hansard HC vol 425(35), col 177 (12 October 2004). 
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